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Coup de Genre: The Trials and Tribulations of Bülent Ersoy1 
Başak Ertür and Alisa Lebow 
 
 
BÜLENT: Help me Doctor, save me from this depression. Am I a 
woman or a man? What am I? 
DOCTOR: Calm down. 
The End of Fame (Orhan Aksoy, 1981) 
 
 
[FIG 1: Bülent Ersoy under arrest, 30 November 1980] 
 
When Jacques Derrida was writing his intervention into genre theory, the essay 
entitled “The Law of Genre,” he could not have known that half a continent away in 
Turkey, a famous and extremely popular pre-op transsexual singer was very publicly 
transgressing the laws of genre and gender in the process of her “transition”. As he 
wrote about a very different kind of self-referential and ultimately uncategorizable 
text, Maurice Blanchot’s Madness of the Day (La folie du jour, 1973), how was he to 
know that in Turkey a film was being made that so bedeviled both genre and gender 
categories that it could have provided him with even more intriguing fodder by which 
to deconstruct generic certainties. Starring Bülent Ersoy, the most famous transsexual 
                                                
1 This article is dedicated to our friend and colleague, Marcos Becquer (1964-2011) who we are certain 
would have loved the madness wrought by the figure of Bülent Ersoy, if only we had had the chance to 
introduce him to her delightful, if at times dubious, charms. Thank you to Cüneyt Çakırlar and Serkan 
Delice for giving us the needed impetus to pursue this research, and to those who have graciously read 
drafts and contributed their knowledge, intelligence, and labor to this effort: Meltem Ahıska, Zeynep 
Dadak, Müge Gürsoy Sökmen, Ferhat Taylan, and our two anonymous readers. Unless otherwise 
indicated, all translations from Turkish are our own. 
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star in Turkey then as now, The End of Fame (Şöhretin Sonu, Orhan Aksoy, 1981) is a 
hastily thrown together, poly-generically perverse, biographical mish-mash of a film 
that openly addresses Ersoy’s gender dysphoria, and stages it in part as a crisis of 
genre. Notably, Ersoy’s public transition, on-screen and off, coincided with another 
sort of public transition – a full-tilt military coup – bringing her face to face with the 
law in a seemingly endless series of trials. A legal system that one would have 
expected to be decisive, categorical and definitive under stern military rule betrayed 
its own illogic when faced with Ersoy’s stubborn intransigence and utter inability to 
obey the normative laws of gender. The fact that her case threw the law into crisis 
after crisis, and produced one legal inconsistency after the next, could easily have 
served as an exemplary scenario to expose Derrida’s proverbial “madness of the law,” 
when confronted with gender/generic uncertainties.  
 
While most will deem The End of Fame and Blanchot’s 1973 récit so different as to 
be incomparable, it is difficult to resist the urge to mix and mingle. And since The 
End of Fame is more than itself,2 overflowing into Bülent Ersoy’s real life trials and 
tribulations, we encounter some key common motifs across these (con)texts: the 
medico-legal representatives of the law who demand the self-accounting of the 
protagonists; the protagonists’ flirtation with the law (“To tempt the law, I called 
softly to her, ‘Come here; let me see you face to face”)3 and indeed, the protagonists’ 
ability to “alarm” and “terrify” the law and the men of law. Derrida, we might add, 
considers the protagonist of The Madness of the Day to also be a transsexual 
character.4 So, when he decreed, albeit disingenuously, that genre – and by 
implication gender – must not be mixed,5 we believe he could have easily been 
referring to Bülent Ersoy, the Turkish judicial system, and/or The End of Fame, all of 
which we will be discussing at some length in this essay.  
 
We begin here with an analysis of this nearly forgotten queer gem of Turkish cinema, 
moving in and out of it to several of Ersoy’s real life court cases in order to explore 
the question of transgression in relation to the laws of both gender and genre. The 
                                                
2 Jacques Derrida, “The Law of Genre,” trans. Avital Ronell, Glyph 7 (Spring 1980), 81.  
3 Maurice Blanchot, The Madness of the Day. Translated by Lydia Davis (New York: Station Hill 
Press, 19810:  9. 
4 Derrida “Law of Genre”, 76. 
5 Ibid., 55. 
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purpose of this analysis is essentially to establish the ways in which Ersoy – as a 
person, as a character, as a star, as a citizen – destabilizes categories both real and 
textual, enabling us to perform a queer reading of a crucial moment, indeed, a 
particularly dark period in Turkish history. This is not to make an improbable heroine 
of the star, nor to resuscitate her for activist purposes – an impossible task considering 
the unalignable and even at times hostile positions Ersoy herself has taken with regard 
to both LGBTT activism and the left.6 Our aim here is rather to review and thus 
present anew an aspect of queer Turkish history that we believe deserves a more 
attentive analysis than it has received heretofore. As will become evident, the timing 
of these events is meaningful: not only did Ersoy’s transition coincide with the lead-
up to and the aftermath of the 1980 coup d’état, but The End of Fame was released 
precisely during the week of her gender reassignment surgery, a mere six months after 
the military took power. It is these simultaneities that propel both the film and the real 
life character of Bülent Ersoy on an unintentional collision course with this other set 
of events that we believe marks them and was in turn marked by them. 
 
The matter of generic transgressions, as we will see, is not as straightforward as it 
may seem. There are ways in which this text fits all too well within the parameters of 
a certain type of Turkish melodrama of the 1970s and ‘80s and ways in which it 
departs. As many readers will be aware, it was far from the exception, possibly even 
the norm, for Turkish cinema of the late 1970s and into the ‘80s to cross genre and 
                                                
6 The ambivalence of her status in relation to LGBTT concerns is amply communicated in Rüstem 
Ertuğ Altınay’s article “Reconstructing the Transgendered Self as a Muslim, Nationalist, Upper-Class 
Woman: The Case of Bülent Ersoy”, Women’s Studies Quarterly 36, no. 3 (Fall-Winter 2008): 210-29. 
Although it provides a good overview of Bülent Ersoy’s career as a public figure, especially for a 
readership entirely unfamiliar with Turkish popular culture, the article uncritically rehearses the more 
commonplace LGBTT disappointment in and criticism of Ersoy. In focusing on Ersoy’s self-
presentation as “a conservative, Muslim, nationalist, upper-class woman” and on her refusal “to use her 
transgendered status as a way to challenge gender codes, heterosexism, patriarchy, nationalism, 
capitalism, or conservatism” (216), the author fails to recognize the profoundly disruptive effects of 
Ersoy’s desire to obey, the destabilization effected by her bargain with hegemony, and the ultimately 
irreducible unruliness of this public figure. One episode that Altınay marshals twice in support of his 
argument is a good case in point: In the wake of the assassination of the Armenian-Turkish journalist 
Hrant Dink in early 2007, Bülent Ersoy, during one of her TV appearances, denounced the popular 
slogan “We are all Armenians”, chanted by hundreds of thousands protesting the assassination. Ersoy 
expressed her discontent with the slogan, asserting vehemently: “I am not a Christian. I am the Muslim 
daughter of Muslim parents”. In analyzing this merely in terms of Ersoy yet again capitulating to the 
terms of Turkish-nationalist-Muslim-conservative ideology (which she of course is) Altınay misses the 
remarkable destabilization and de-essentialization of Turkish-nationalist-Muslim-conservative identity 
produced by Ersoy’s claim that she was born a Muslim girl. A more nuanced discussion of Ersoy in 
relation to queer politics can be found in Eser Selen, “The Stage: A Space for Queer Subjectification in 
Turkey” in Gender, Place and Culture: A Journal of Feminist Geography Vol. 19, no. 6 (2012): 730-
749.  
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break all rules of narrative cohesion, if not coherence. Indeed, unlike the 
predominantly literary genres that Derrida was writing about, filmic genres, and 
certainly Turkish filmic genres, have always mixed to some degree.7 We might even 
say, as cultural critic Murat Belge did at the time, that Turkish film made up a genre 
of its own.8 The End of Fame is no exception in this regard, and we will not claim that 
it is unrecognizable amongst its filmic peers in relation to particular formal or 
narrative properties. In fact, it can be situated easily within the strand of Turkish 
cinema that features the most popular singers of the day, based loosely on their 
biographical details of which the public would likely already have been aware.9 This 
particular type of mixing found its expression in Turkish cinema from the 1940s 
onwards in “films with songs” (şarkılı filmler) where popular singers played the 
leading role in films that served as vehicles for their songs.10 In the 1970s, these films 
were associated with the emergent arabesk style of music and featured all of its top 
stars,11 including Ersoy, who made more than ten such films.12 Yet there are 
nonetheless some identifiable features of this film that may be said to exceed the 
form. 
 
                                                
7 All films can be said to be generically impure, indeed the issue is not a matter of pure vs mixed genre 
but one of excess –– the intensified and exaggerated mixing of generic elements. Turkish cinema of 
that era is close in form to Egyptian filmic conventions in its nearly incessant generic mixings, see 
Martin Stokes, The Republic of Love: Cultural Intimacy in Turkish Popular Music (Chicago: 
University of Chicago Press, 2010): 19, 97n36. 
8 Murat Belge, Tarihten Güncelliğe (Istanbul: İletişim, 1983), 424. 
9 Martin Stokes, “Music, Fate and State: Turkey’s Arabesk Debate,” Middle East Report (Sept-Oct 
1989): 27.  
10 For a brief history of this genre borrowed from Egyptian cinema, the first Turkish example of which 
was Allahın Cenneti (Muhsin Ertuğrul, 1939) featuring Münir Nurettin Selçuk, see Meral Özbek, 
Popüler Kültür ve Orhan Gencebay Arabeski (İstanbul: İletişim, 2010), 150-52. 
11 The musical style known as arabesk became popular in Turkey the mid-1970s, and was so named 
because of its hybrid roots in predominantly Arab-influenced melodies. Other arabesk stars of the day, 
such as Ferdi Tayfur, Ibrahim Tatlıses and Orhan Gencebay also “used cinema as a showcase for their 
songs.” Zeynep Dadak, “İsyanla Tekniğin Buluşması,” Altyazı 85 (June 2009): 35.  
12 Surprisingly little has been written in English about Arabesk films as a genre or cinematic 
movement. When referenced at all in the now multiple books on Turkish cinema, it is generally 
relegated to a dismissive footnote, as in Eylem Atakav’s book Women in Turkish Cinema, where she 
says “The term ‘arabesque films’ is named after arabesque music, which is a popular genre in Turkey 
influenced by Arab popular and Islamic folk music. These films have singers of arabesque music as 
their main characters and tell tragic life stories particularly related to migration from Eastern to 
Western Turkey.” p. 49, fn 47. Gönül Dönmez-Colin dismisses it as a derided decadent form that 
“conveyed a sense of nostalgia felt by the alienated urban Anatolian for the old traditions.” She does 
note, importantly, that the genre was ‘[c]learly masculinist and mostly sung by men, …idealiz[ing] the 
rural home left behind and lament[ing] the impossibility of return…” Turkish Cinema: Identity, 
Distance and Belonging (London: Reaktion Books, 2008):40. We eagerly await the full-length study of 
arabesk cinema in Turkey forthcoming by Zeynep Dadak (PhD Dissertation, NYU Cinema Studies, in 
progress).  
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Why mention genre transgressions when it is a commonplace in this type of 
filmmaking, one might ask. To which we reply that in this particular case, the 
“madness” of the text throws light on the blurred boundaries between a fictional 
account and its real life counterpart, making indistinct the transitions and 
interpenetrations between the two; the formal and narrative excesses of this film 
exquisitely mirroring the unusual challenge that Ersoy posed to the law. Indeed, just 
as Blanchot’s text, according to Derrida, satirically practices all genres to finally 
“inundate and divide the borders between literature and its others,” (“Law of Genre”, 
81) The End of Fame too, fuses various genres to overflow not only the boundaries 
between fictional genres but also those between fiction and documentary, reenacting 
and pre-enacting real life events. Even if dwelling on the ruptures of basic storytelling 
rules and the unlikely ordering or juxtaposition of events in this film would only place 
it in the context of the madness of the day’s filmmaking conventions more generally, 
dwell we must. For despite the resemblances this film may have to others, this is no 
ordinary story, and its narrative excesses and incoherencies unleash some unexpected 
resonances and effects. True to its arabesk roots, The End of Fame is a triple genre 
film: a melodrama, biopic, as well as a musical. Significantly for our purposes, it also 
incorporates documentary incursions, featuring an endless stream of actual album 
covers, newspaper headlines and concert footage, making it not quite a documentary, 
yet frequently breaking the fourth wall of the biopic with the eruption of actuality.13 
There was no dearth of material to choose from with all of the press attention Ersoy 
received, but with the outlandishness of its subject matter, this film has added impetus 
to shore up its biographical claims.  
 
The film begins with a jolt, after the silent, almost somber credits over black, opening 
with a shot of a nightclub marquee emblazoned with Bülent Ersoy’s name in huge 
letters, accompanied by a soundtrack of her singing. From there the film intercuts 
footage from several of her live concerts. The costumes range from modestly 
feminine in a tight but tasteful pants suit, to flauntingly femme, her heels impossibly 
high and her dresses glitteringly sequined, even though the film ostensibly begins 
                                                
13As Stokes notes, “[in arabesk films] the interdependent relationship of film and reality is striking.” 
Arabesk Debate, 138. Earlier in the book he also specifies that “the life stories of arabesk [singers] are 
intimately known and regularly updated in the tabloid and music press. Details of these biographies 
combine with their coverage in the press and the stories told in the films which the singers invariably 
retain their ‘real’ names…to form a fictionalized biography that is essentially bound up with the 
experience of the music.” 114. 
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with the premise that Bülent is a heterosexual man, complete with a girlfriend.14 Yet 
the footage unequivocally establishes the star with her thousands upon thousands of 
adoring fans, in all her glory, as if to say, this story is going to defy social norms, but 
rest assured, her mainstream audience accepts and adores her. The integration or 
incorporation of actuality footage from concerts and appearances could, of course, 
have an economic motive as well, since it would have been far cheaper to use footage 
from a concert (or rather six different concerts) than to stage them for the film.15 But 
in a story that is about to go a bit haywire, and a subject of gender dysphoria certainly 
pushing boundaries of credibility at the time, such documentary authentications may 
have also been deemed necessary, beyond any economic calculations or filmic 
conventions. If the public could so admiringly embrace her stage persona, then they 
could be enlisted to sympathize with its consequences behind the scenes. It becomes a 
matter of complicity and ultimately, the gambit seeks allies wherever they may be 
found, in this case, with the Turkish “public”.  
 
[FIG 2a +2b] 
                                                
14 There is an important precedent to this ruse with the films and stage career of Zeki Müren, whose 
famously and undeniably feminine costumes were so outlandish that they were sometimes likened to a 
space alien’s wardrobe, despite the fact that he always played a heterosexual man in his films. 
However, Müren, for all of his flamboyance, always remained discrete about his sexuality, never 
mentioning it publicly and indeed denying it when asked directly, whereas Ersoy has been a much 
more publically controversial figure. For an interesting discussion about Müren’s costumes in relation 
to gender and sexuality, see Stokes, Republic of Love, 45fn 5, 64-66. Also mentioned in Gönül 
Dönmez-Colin’s introduction to her book, Turkish Cinema: Identity, Distance and Belonging (London: 
Reaktion Books, 2008):17-18. The most insightful English-language discussion we’ve encountered 
with regard to Müren and his stage persona is Eser Selen’s essay, “The Stage: A Space for Queer 
Subjectification in Contemporary Turkey,” op cit.; while Umut Tümay Arslan provides a masterful 
reading of three of his films in relation to the anxieties of Turkish national identity, citizenship and 
modernity in “Sublime yet Ridiculous: Turkishness and the Cinematic Image of Zeki Müren”, New 
Perspectives on Turkey 45 (Fall 2011), 185-213. 
15 There are many instances of archival concert footage being used in this type of film more generally 
Martin Stokes, The Arabesk Debate: Music and Musicians in Modern Turkey (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1992), 114-115 and 123. The radical gender bending of this film distinguishes it from its 
contemporaries, though it has to be said, it is very much in line with, though goes further than, earlier 
Ersoy vehicles. 
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The film is replete with vertiginous pleasures, as the spectator is asked to behold a 
high-fem pre-op transsexual performing herself as a young man — with tits — as s/he 
sings a love song to his/her beloved and long-suffering girlfriend in what must 
simultaneously be seen as a lesbian love scene. [FIG 2a +2b] Wealth and success 
come easily but happiness eludes, driving Bülent to secretly consult a psychiatrist 
who counsels (her) to give (his) heterosexuality another go, though she is undoubtedly 
a woman in affect and appearance in the scene. The star narrates the story of her 
“humble” childhood to the psychiatrist as we see an image of a huge family mansion, 
and inside it an effeminate little boy clumsily playing with dolls and makeup. Later on 
she is spotted near a park by a child who looks up at his mother and asks the question 
on everyone’s mind, not least the star’s own: “Mother, is Bülent Ersoy a man or a 
woman?” The question echoes in the mind of the already haunted Bülent as she is 
driven aimlessly around the city by her chauffeur in her finest furs, “A man or a 
woman?” resounding in her tortured ears. Here we have all the hallmarks of camp as 
outlined many years ago by Susan Sontag: extravagant excess, celebration of artifice, 
style over substance, narrative failures, and above all, a naïve wish to be believed.16 
Indeed, for all its excesses, this is a text that hopes to have some credibility, 
positioning its star as a troubled but ultimately well-intentioned and responsible 
member of society, propping its claims upon the documentary verification of the 
archival material.  
 
 
                                                
16 Susan Sontag, “Notes on ‘Camp’” originally published in 1964 in the Partisan Review, reprinted in 
Against Interpretation and Other Essays (New York: Penguin, 2009), 275-92. This article has, of 
course, come under attack by many queer theorists since, from Michael Bronski and D. A. Miller, to 
Ann Pellegrini, but we still believe, despite its inconsistencies and its alleged indifference to the 
specificity of the gay/lesbian subcultural context, that her ruminations are nonetheless an indispensible 
touchstone for any discussion on camp and prove particularly apt here. 
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[FIG 3: Bülent in the psychiatrist’s office who tells  
(her) to give (his) heterosexuality another go] 
 
Narratively, the film incorporates at least four conflicting strands that the script makes 
some — inevitably failed — attempt to resolve at the end: The story of Bülent’s 
transition which is utterly bereft of linear chronology; Bülent’s (straight? lesbian?) 
affair with her girlfriend Aslı; Bülent’s (straight? gay?) relationship with her male 
violinist Doğan; and the story of her rise to fame, stricken with the same 
chronological hysteria that saturates the entire film. The plot proceeds fitfully, jerking 
from one strand to the next, unpredictably and without logic, though with great and 
unmotivated costume changes. It is not only Bülent’s transition that is told in shall we 
say, “creative chronology,” but every other aspect as well. How is it, for instance, that 
girlfriend Aslı, who is with Bülent every evening as the star performs in sequins with 
feather boas and high heels, doesn’t notice until more than half way through the film 
that Bülent is not quite the man she thought he was? “To whom do these women’s 
clothes, this jewelry, belong?” she asks incredulously as the violins swell to 
emphasize her shock and dismay.17 The unruly narrative itself seems to reflect, in the 
form of hysterical symptom, the madness of the day. 
 
This film, chronicling Bülent’s rise to fame and her gender crisis, is significant in 
terms of its wider historical context, the timing of its release, and its place within 
Ersoy’s biography and filmography. Let us take the “calculated risk” and try to 
convey this context as linearly as possible, even if it may be something of an affront 
to The End of Fame’s convoluted chronological circumlocutions.18 Bülent Ersoy 
made a swift rise to fame in the mid-1970s as a male singer, interpreting classical 
Turkish songs with his widely acclaimed style and voice. At the height of his fame, in 
1979, Ersoy began to publicly and visibly transition from male to female – she started 
                                                
17 Disavowals such as these are perhaps not uncommon in narratives of cross-dressing and even 
transsexuality. The difference in this film from other cross-dressing narratives (e.g., Some Like it Hot, 
Billy Wilder, 1959, Tootsie, Sydney Pollack, 1982, Victor/Victoria, Blake Edwards, 1982, etc.) is that 
Bülent’s character is seemingly unaware of herself, made to disavow her own ‘difference’ even as she 
is driven to distraction by it. Unlike the films mentioned here, she has nothing to gain and everything to 
lose by the acknowledgment of her gender expression, despite its insistent appearance. This is different 
too from the all the more rare trans narrative (e.g. Boys Don’t Cry, Kimberly Peirce, 1999) where 
passing as one’s chosen gender is the main goal. In The End of Fame Bülent is meant to, at the same 
time, both be and not be gendered female. This is the central bind of the film. 
18 In attempting to discuss Blanchot’s récit, Derrida conveys yet another directly applicable sentiment 
when he says, “It is even less feasible for me to relate to you the story of La folie du jour which is 
staked precisely on the possibility and the impossibility of relating a story.” “Law of Genre,” 67. 
 9 
hormone therapy, and began to dress and present herself as a woman. This was quite 
controversial, of course, and irresistible to the press, even in the midst of a 
tempestuous climate of political violence, austerity measures, and localized martial 
law enforcements. A page one news article from the widely circulated daily Hürriyet 
on 18 January 1980, gives us an indication of the effect that her transition was having 
on the public.19 The headline blares: “Bülent Ersoy was debated in Parliament.” The 
smaller font headline above notes that due to this diversion, a parliamentary 
commission failed to discuss crucial martial law legislation in the same session. In the 
summary of the article we learn that the Parliament addressed the question of austerity 
measures only after the Ersoy debate. Let us emphasize here that the austerity 
measures in question were the infamous 24 January 1980 decisions, the 
implementation of which were widely considered to be the economic impetus for the 
12 September 1980 coup d’état.20 According to this telling news article, Ahmet 
Buldanlı from the conservative Adalet (Justice) Party, took the floor to speculate that 
Ersoy must be tremendously wealthy based on photographs of her21 with expensive 
jewelry. He expresses his suspicions that she must not be paying enough tax and calls 
the country’s prosecutors to task for not going after her. But when we read the full 
speech, we realize that this highly speculative claim as to Ersoy’s tax liability is partly 
a subterfuge,22 and the main issue at stake is the mixed feelings brought up for him by 
her body in transition. On the one hand Buldanlı talks about the “degeneration of 
morals in Turkey” and calls for propriety, dignity, humanity and Turkishness, 
referring to Ersoy as “[t]his goddamned freak who no one knows whether it’s a man 
or a woman.” On the other hand, he seems not to have been able to take his eyes off 
of this “woman...with a beautiful cleavage,” saying, bewilderingly, that she’s “more 
beautiful than most women who consider themselves beautiful.” Bülent Ersoy’s 
response cleverly emphasizes this ambivalent desire: “For some reason Ahmet Bey 
                                                
19 “Meclis’te Bülent Ersoy tartışıldı,” Hürriyet, 18 January 1980. 
20 See Feroz Ahmad, “Military Intervention and the Crisis in Turkey,” Merip Reports (Jan 1981): 5. 
21 In Turkish, no gender pronouns are used, so Buldanlı would not have given the gender in this 
context, though shortly thereafter, we see he has indeed “gendered” Ersoy female in the most lascivious 
terms. It is impossible to translate into English without using gender pronouns, but it may be helpful for 
the reader to keep in mind that everywhere “she” or “he” is used in a quote or paraphrase, the original 
Turkish is actually gender neutral. This is particularly important for our translations of newspaper 
articles, lest the reader were to assume that the media was either forced or able to gender her by use of 
third person pronouns.  
22 Subsequent to Budanlı’s tirade on the floor of the Parliament, the government does go after her for 
alleged tax evasion. 
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has fixated on me. Given that he speaks about me when the important problems of the 
country are at stake, he must have something in mind.”23  
 
Soon after, in March 1980, Ersoy declares that she would undergo gender 
reassignment surgery.24 The following month, Beddua (Curse, Osman F. Seden, 
1980), Ersoy’s film just before The End of Fame, went on general release. In the 
production phase it was announced that this was to be the last film where Ersoy would 
perform a male role and the costume shopping that Ersoy did for the film was treated 
in a newspaper article, with the headline, “Bülent Ersoy Wears Masculine 
Clothing.”25 The character that she plays in Beddua is a provincial, poor but dignified, 
sensitive, artistically-inclined young man. Beddua’s specious internal logic suggests 
that a sexual assault by a male villager during his childhood made the young Bülent 
indifferent to the charms of women, yet he nonetheless falls in love with Perihan, the 
daughter of the factory owner where he works. Perihan also loves him, but the class 
difference between them makes their love impossible. In the meantime Bülent proves 
his superior musical talent as a young teacher at the conservatory, but is forced at 
gunpoint to perform in night clubs. Here the montage sequence of several stage 
numbers indicates time passing and with it the transformation of Bülent’s stage 
costume, which becomes increasingly feminine. There is no dialogue, yet we 
understand that some sort of transition is taking place with regard to his/her gender 
expression. In this film, as in The End of Fame, newspaper headlines are introduced to 
indicate the change. These headlines are not integrated into the narrative of the film, 
but they are clearly performing an expository function. At the end of the film, when 
the lovers are finally reunited after many years with the promise of heterosexual 
redemption for the fallen Bülent, they are caught in the crosshairs of Perihan’s ex-
husband’s rage. He shoots them both, thus effecting the cinematic death of the not 
quite convincing heterosexual male Bülent, never to be seen on screen again, except 
in flashback drag.  
 
                                                
23 “Meclis’te Bülent Ersoy tartışıldı,” Hürriyet, 18 January 1980. 
24 “Bülent Ersoy kadın oluyor!,” Hürriyet, 5 March 1980. This declaration is followed in the same 
article by Ersoy’s challenge: “the first thing I’ll do after the operation will be to settle accounts with the 
parliamentarian Ahment Buldanlı, who criticized me in the parliament. I’ll make him fall for me. I’ll 
prove to him that I’m a woman.” 
25 “Bülent Ersoy ‘erkekçe’ giyindi,” Hürriyet, 12 January 1980. 
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After the general release of Beddua, Bülent Ersoy’s first major newsworthy public 
stunt was to expose her breasts at a concert in August 1980. She was prosecuted for 
indecent exposure and the first hearing of her trial took place on 2 September 1980, 
from which point onwards, she made front page headlines every single day until 12 
September, when the tanks rolled into Ankara and she was upstaged by the coup 
d’état. It only took about a week or so after the coup for Ersoy to find her place back 
on the front page when she was arrested for drunkenly insulting a judge. She was 
imprisoned and kept in a ward of her own, as prison authorities were unable to decide 
whether she belonged in the men’s or the women’s ward. By now she was involved in 
two trials simultaneously: one for indecent exposure, one for insulting a judge on 
duty. 
 
It is reported that Ersoy initially wore women’s clothes to her hearings. Then we read 
in an article dated 7 October 1980, “it has been announced that Bülent Ersoy will 
appear at her trial tomorrow in men’s clothes as a show of her remorse.”26 In 
November, after about a month and a half in detention, she was found guilty in both 
trials, given a fine in the first, and a prison sentence of eleven months and twenty days 
in the second. However, her sentence was suspended on account of her “good 
behavior,” presumably because she appeared in male attire at the sentencing trial. The 
newspaper reports that the judge concluded Ersoy’s trial with this word of advice: 
“This is your last chance. Use it well. Get your act together.”27 The elements that 
we’ve emphasized here — disorderly conduct, legal trials, the attire, the contrition, 
the judge’s unsolicited advice — all find dramatic expression in The End of Fame, 
mere months later. 
 
In January 1981, the Istanbul police vice-squad issued an official warning to Ersoy as 
well as to others who “resemble more a woman than a man in their clothes and 
behavior onstage and in their private lives.” She was forced to sign a statement 
confirming that “from now on while performing, I will wear normal clothes on stage 
and I will refrain from any unseemly postures or behavior.”28 In this way she, along 
with other M2F trans and crossdressing performers, was effectively banned from 
                                                
26 “Bülent Ersoy duruşmaya erkek giysileriyle çıkacak,” Milliyet, 7 October 1980. 
27 “Bülent Ersoy önce mahkum oldu, sonra tahliye edildi,” Milliyet, 4 November 1980. 
28 “Bülent Ersoy giyimini düzeltmesi için emniyete çağrılarak uyarıldı,” Milliyet, 28 January 1981. 
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appearing on stage in women’s clothes. At the end of March 1981, Ersoy traveled to 
London to undergo the gender reassignment surgery that she had announced over a 
year before. When she went under the knife on 14 April 1981, The End of Fame had 
been on general release in Turkey for a week, the film effectively transitioning her in 
her absence. In a recent interview, Ersoy revealed that the film in fact funded her 
surgery.29  
 
In the film, as in life, Ersoy finds herself face to face with the law in both the juridical 
and psychoanalytic sense. Her gender transition for the courts (celluloid and 
otherwise) appears to be less a matter of bio-medical concern than a social and moral 
one, badly in need of sound judgment, guidance, and if necessary, regulation.  
 
 
[FIGS 4-7: Clockwise from top left: Doğan her violinist, the psychiatrist,  
Nihat her manager, old friend Murat]  
 
The law, the force of the regulatory norm, is variously embodied in The End of Fame 
through a wide array of male characters, and yet with each, their authority is 
eventually and inevitably compromised or subverted. There’s Bülent’s kind but stern 
manager, Nihat, a fantasy of a father figure who while appreciative and supportive of 
Bülent, also disciplines her and tempers her tendency for tantrums and other such 
                                                
29 “‘Deniz Gezmiş gazoz alırdı ben ona şarkı söylerdim’: Bülent Ersoy, İzzet Çapa’ya konuştu,” 
Habertürk, 3 January 2012. 
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diva-like behavior. But Bülent behaves so badly, so outrageously, that she manages to 
alienate even him until they are ambiguously reunited at the end of the film. There’s 
the shrink, a parody of Sigmund Freud with his goatee and thick glasses, who 
attempts to impose the medical norm, and though he serves to introduce a short-lived 
narrative order into the film (“Tell me about your childhood”) his hetero-normative 
intervention fails spectacularly to bring Bülent into line. Then there’s Doğan, Bülent’s 
composer/violinist and love interest, who is charged with the task of reciting the 
“public morality” line to Bülent, reprimanding and rejecting her for her 
“unacceptable” lifestyle which goes against the “values of our society”. And yet, he 
(and with him, one could argue, the entire public morality construct) is totally 
compromised when the film finally insinuates that he actually did get entangled with 
Bülent before rushing into propriety by engagement to a decent young woman. Then 
there’s Murat, an old friend to both Bülent and her girlfriend Aslı, who admonishes 
Bülent for depriving Aslı of what she deserves: a real man. He further declares 
authoritatively, with his mustachioed masculinity intact, that “neither I nor society 
deem you a man”. Bülent is able to buy back Murat’s respect and high opinion, in a 
classic exchange between men à la Lévi-Strauss, handing the girlfriend over to Murat 
for marriage,30 to which Murat responds with a mix of admiration and humility: 
“Forgive me, I was wrong about you, you are indeed a magnanimous and honorable 
person.”  
 
[FIG 8: The judge] 
                                                
30 Although this is not Bülent’s only macho manoeuvre in the film (she protests loudly when Murat 
insults her masculinity, and the scene of her drunken bout with Doğan has some violent macho 
overtones, despite the girly scream at the end), it is by far the most pronounced. Precisely at the 
moment when she is meant to be renouncing her claims to masculinity, admitting once and for all that 
she is never going to fulfil the role properly, she does so by trading a woman in a back-door negotiation 
between men (herself and Murat). 
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This stumbling parade of male embodiments of the law culminates with the literal 
arrival of the law in the form of the judge toward the end of the film: Bülent is on trial 
for drunken, disorderly conduct, not at all unlike the behavior for which she had been 
tried in real life only months before. The judge appears at a point in the narrative 
when the previous contenders have utterly failed to contain her unruliness, and her 
scandalous conduct has reached new lows. In this scene, which is featured in the 
film’s poster,31 the charges are dropped: Bülent is acquitted. The concluding trial 
scene serves, of course, as a fictional re-enactment of her recent real life trials. But 
presciently, too, it serves even more as a fictional pre-enactment, “reiterating in 
advance” as Derrida would say, more real life trials to come.32 
 
[FIG 9a and 9b Ersoy at her various real-life hearings] 
 
Indeed, the first seven years of Ersoy’s post-op public life were marked by recurrent 
newspaper images and accounts of her standing trial. These accounts detailed her 
clothing, makeup, hairstyles in the courtroom, at times even more than the substance 
of the trials themselves.33 In this period it was distinctly as if life imitated art where 
the penultimate scene in The End of Fame was being endlessly repeated in actual 
court appearances as recounted in salacious newspaper and magazine articles. In 
                                                
31 See Fig. 10. 
32 Not to belabor the connection to Derrida’s reading of The Madness of the Day, but here too Derrida’s 
description of that text as creating “a permanent revolution of order [as] it follows, doubles, or 
reiterates it in advance” is particularly apt. And we would be remiss in this context, if we were to 
ignore the suggestive process of “invagination” that he claims the pre- and post-shadowings produce. 
“Law of Genre,” 71. 
33 For example, one such article announces in the caption, “Bülent Ersoy, who came to court in a black 
and silver striped fox fur over a black silk bodysuit and huge gold earrings dangling from her ears, 
handing out autographs to her fans.” In the summary of the news piece we read, “While her lawyers 
insistently referred to her as Miss Ersoy, the judge objected saying, ‘In court one is referred to by one’s 
name only, no “misters” or “misses” are allowed here,’ upon which Ersoy replied, ‘Pardon me, Your 
Honor, but this is how I am accustomed to being addressed.’” Milliyet, 3 December 1981. 
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addition to several trivial trials (i.e., for disorderly conduct, contravening foreign 
currency laws, tax evasion, forged travel documents, copyright infringement, etc., for 
which she was mostly acquitted), Ersoy had to deal with two major simultaneous legal 
battles that began upon her return from London and went on for almost a decade. One 
was her legal battle to gain official recognition as a woman, and the other was the 
public performance ban targeting her as a “homosexual”, or a “man who wears 
women’s clothing”. In these intertwined legal processes, it is not an overstatement to 
claim that Bülent Ersoy unsettled the law by virtue of her very being. 
 
If the representatives of the law in The End of Fame reveal their inadequacy and 
inconsistency, consider now, the bumbling incoherence of the actual legal apparatus 
in the face of Bülent Ersoy’s claims. Ersoy was neither the first post-op transsexual in 
Turkey, nor the first person to attempt to change her official gender status. There had 
been several others preceding her case, and to our knowledge, all were successful.34 
Thus, it was neither outrageous nor unheard of for Ersoy to have gone to court with 
her claim, upon returning from London.35 In that first, straightforward case, the judge 
referred Ersoy to a local Medical Council for physical examination along with 
ordering a notarized translation of the medical report from England. When the doctors 
from the council stated that they could detect no difference between those who are 
born female and Ersoy, the judge approved her application. 
 
However, within weeks, a public prosecutor appealed this decision, claiming that 
although Ersoy was “in appearance” a woman, she could not be considered a “real 
woman” medically, despite the medical reports to the contrary.36 The Supreme Court 
sat on the case for a full six months, before eventually deciding that Ersoy’s gender 
case be retried since, “in order to establish whether the claimant has become a woman 
                                                
34According to Michael R. Will and Bilge Öztan, before Ersoy’s case there were at least five known 
successful cases who applied to officially change their gender. For this, a general provision was used 
which allowed amendment of personal details (such as place/date of birth, name, religion, etc.) in the 
state registry and thus on one’s ID card, subject to a judge’s approval. See Will and Öztan, “Hukukun 
Sebebiyet Verdiği Bir Acı: Transseksüellerin Hukuki Durumu,” Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi 
Dergisi 43, no: 1-4 (1993): 235. For more information on these cases, see Adnan Öztürel, 
“Transseksüalizm ile Hermafrodizmde Yasasal Tıpsal ve Adli Tıp Problemleri (Kadınlaşan Erkekler, 
Erkekleşen Kadınlar, İki Cinsliler), Kısım II,” Ankara Üniversitesi Hukuk Fakültesi Dergisi 38, no. 1-4 
(1981): 268-73.  
35 The court where she filed then and subsequently was the Fatih District Court in Istanbul, otherwise 
known as the Fatih Court of the First Instance. 
36 “Bülent Ersoy’un kadınlık kararının bozulması için Yargıtay’a başvuruldu,” Milliyet, 4 July 1981. 
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in the real sense of the word, medical opinion must be sought.”37 This decision 
ignored the obvious fact that the first decision was based precisely upon such medical 
opinion.38 Nonetheless, as in any good comedy of errors, the case was retried in May 
1982, in the same local court. This time the court referred her to the “fully equipped” 
Şişli Children’s Hospital, requesting an additional report from the Psychiatric Chair of 
Çapa Medical Faculty. Conveniently, and in direct contradiction of all previous 
reports, these two authorities claimed that Ersoy was “not a transsexual but a male 
homosexual, and therefore had failed to become a woman, though without the 
possibility of returning to his manhood.” On the basis of these reports, the public 
prosecutor argued that “the principles of biology and law” do not allow for someone 
to “have artificial female genitalia made for himself and then go on to claim that he’s 
a woman.” Ersoy lost the retrial.39 One of the phrases in the legal judgment would 
haunt Ersoy during the course of these trials: “No one can do as they please with their 
body.”40  
 
Delayed but not deterred, Ersoy’s next attempt to gain official recognition as a woman 
was two years later, in 1984, again in the Fatih District Court. This time, she had 
acquired a report from the National Institute of Legal Medicine and Forensic Sciences 
(Adli Tıp), which stated without equivocation that she was a woman in terms of her 
physical appearance, genitalia and psychology.41 Still, the lower court refused her 
claim, so she once again appealed the decision.42 The same Supreme Court that had 
previously stated the need for medical authorization, chose, this time, to disregard the 
medical report produced by the highest medico-legal authority in the country. So in a 
                                                
37 Yargıtay 2. Hukuk Dairesi, 21 January 1982, E: 1981/8911, K: 1982/259, Yargıtay Kararları Dergisi 
(1982): 323. 
38 Another strange twist in this case was that two members of the Supreme Court had opposed the 
decision to retry the case, wanting to rule against Ersoy instead. They claimed that Ersoy could never 
be considered a woman and thus that “there is no necessity for further investigation, since the 
complainant was born male and lived as a male beyond puberty.” The dissenting opinion stated that 
“the sex change operation was a wanton, willful act the consequences of which the complainant would 
simply have to endure.” “Otherwise,” the text goes on, “this would make it possible for every man 
wishing to benefit from the advantages of being a woman to achieve this by taking on the role of a 
woman. There is no doubt that this would alter the equilibrium of nature and destabilize and confuse 
the value judgments of society.” Also see Deniz Kandiyoti, “Pink Card Blues,” in Fragments of 
Culture: The Everyday of Modern Turkey, Deniz Kandiyoti and Ayşe Saktanber, eds. (London: IB 
Tauris, 2002): 279n13.  
39 Fatih 3. Asliye Hukuk Mahkemesi, 6 September 1982, E. 1982/254, K. 1982, 420. 
40 “Bülent Ersoy’un kadınlığı reddedildi,” Milliyet, 7 September 1982. The retrial was appealed and 
this time the Supreme Court upheld the lower court’s decision. 
41 “Adli Tıp Ersoy’un kadınlığını kabul etti,” Milliyet, 23 December 1984. 
42 “Doktorlara göre kadın, hakimlere göre erkek,” Milliyet, 24 January 1985.  
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complete about-face, contradicting all previous decisions, the high court ruled that in 
fact, a medical report could not have any effect on the legal decision, and that the 
lower court was correct in refusing Ersoy’s claim. The detailed decision published 
later is an extraordinary piece of garbled legal rhetoric, employing highly improbable 
logic, and an unseemly moralizing tone that displays the court’s utter 
incomprehension of the condition of gender dysphoria, as well as its bias against all 
non-normative expressions of gender. It also reveals quite succinctly the threat which 
the undecidability of the transgender body poses to the question of identity upon 
which such legal judgments rest. Here is an excerpt from the decision:  
 
The laws currently in force do not allow sex change on the basis of personal 
will [...] Such permission [...] would pave the way for fraudulence before the 
law. For example, persons unable to divorce their spouse would undergo sex 
change and thereby obtain the opportunity to divorce on the basis of the 
principle that people of same sex cannot be married. Others may use this 
opportunity to evade their duty as men to perform their military service [...] or 
to gain the right as a woman to retire earlier, or to profit unfairly from other 
such benefits.43 
 
The Supreme Court’s fantasy of the subject who undergoes gender reassignment 
surgery in order to avoid military service, facilitate a divorce, or expedite 
retirement44 is fascinating on various counts. First of all it betrays the court’s sheer 
ignorance of how complex a psychological, medical and social process transitioning 
can be. The assumption here is that if gender reassignment was allowed, everybody 
would do it, especially so in order to relieve themselves of their filial, civic, and 
economic obligations. The citizen/subject imagined here is one that wants out and 
given the opportunity, will do anything to dodge (his) duties. The decision also 
betrays a desire to police differential gender obligations to the state, underpinned by 
the presumption that being a woman comprises a lesser form of citizenship. Further, 
the fantasy exposes how the law conceives of the transgender body that stands before 
it as something that threatens the very foundation of its authority. When faced with a 
body that proclaims itself other than transparent, and a “personal will” that decides 
the fate of its own body, thus placing it beyond the absolute control of the law, the 
law exclaims “Fraud!”, thus establishing its power over subjects precisely through a 
knowledge of the body. Indeed, as many readers will be aware, this anxiety of fraud 
vis-à-vis transgendered bodies is not limited to this particular moment in this 
                                                
43 Yargıtay 2. Hukuk Dairesi, 27 March 1986, E. 1986/651, K. 1986/3256, Yargıtay Kararları Dergisi 
(1986): 1112. 
44 Historically the minimum age of retirement has been lower for women in Turkey.  
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particular country. In his extensive research on transgender jurisprudence in common 
law countries, Andrew Sharpe discusses how the law has been motivated by a similar 
fear of fraud with regard to marriages involving transgendered persons.45 In a more 
recent study, Paisley Currah and Tara Mulqueen explore the contemporary high-tech 
security apparatuses in airports operated by agents who depend on gender as 
biometric data, that is, as unchanging information from the body, consequently often 
perceiving transgendered persons as other than who they claim to be, and thus as 
potential security threats.46 Similarly universal are the specific areas of biopolitical 
investment that the Turkish Supreme Court’s 1986 decision on Bülent Ersoy reveals, 
namely in the areas of marriage, military and work.  
 
However, in reading this scandalous decision47 it is also important to think about 
what is at stake specifically in Turkey under military rule. The decision continues: 
[...] The fact that the appellant is now incapable of reclaiming his capacities as 
a man due to an operation that he underwent of his own free will, does not 
justify that he be granted his wish to be recognized as a woman. [...]Everyone 
must suffer the consequences of their mistakes. It is not right to look for 
solutions on the basis of sentiments. Because as compassionate as the law is in 
the face of right, it is unyielding in the face of misdeed.48  
 
The court rules out sentiment as a basis of legal judgment: It will refuse any affective 
bond with Ersoy, it will resist seduction by her appeals. The “misdeed” referred to in 
this passage has to do with the court’s delineation of willfully undergoing gender 
reassignment surgery as a breach of Article 23 of the Turkish Civil Code which 
legislates against the illegal or immoral waiving or restricting of one’s own rights and 
capacity to act freely. A creative interpretation of this clause allowed the Supreme 
Court to assert that “No one has the right to dispose of the integrity of their body 
(including their sexual integrity and its continuity)”49 and thus to represent Ersoy’s act 
of undergoing surgery as an infringement of her own personal rights. In other words, a 
clause that was formulated to protect individual liberty was recast as an interdict 
                                                
45 Sharpe explains this fear in terms of law’s homophobia. See especially Chapter 5 in Andrew N. 
Sharpe, Transgender Jurisprudence: Dysphoric Bodies of Law (London: Cavendish, 2002).  
46 Paisley Currah and Tara Mulqueen, “Securitizing Gender: Identity, Biometrics, and Transgender 
Bodies at the Airport,” Social Research 78, no: 2 (2011): 557-582. 
47 Undersigned by a majority including Justice Ahmet Necdet Sezer, who later served as the President 
of the Republic of Turkey between 2000 and 2007. 
48 Yargıtay 2. Hukuk Dairesi, 27 March 1986. 
49 ibid. 
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against gender reassignment.50 It is crucial to note here that this decision came in the 
wake of a military coup, the deeds of which included hundreds of thousands of 
arrests, widespread torture, hundreds of deaths under detention, judicial and 
extrajudicial executions, and the denaturalization of thousands of people, among 
various other atrocities.51 In the context of this immediate historical background, the 
language of the Supreme Court decision indicates that the state not only reserves the 
right to withhold recognition of atypically gendered bodies, but even more starkly, it 
claims the right to dispose of the personal rights and bodily integrity of its subjects, as 
its exclusive, sovereign prerogative. Remember the line from the ruling four years 
earlier: “No one can do as they please with their body.” While in essence the state 
always retains such authority, the restrictions become considerably more stringent 
under military rule, and such flagrant intransigence displayed by the unruly Bülent 
Ersoy was most certainly not to be countenanced.  
 
The second major legal struggle Ersoy was embroiled in was the stage ban, related to 
but distinct from her gender recognition saga. Going back chronologically to 1981, 
when Ersoy returned from London and had (temporarily) gained recognition as a 
woman, she was scheduled to take the stage for her first post-op concert performance. 
On that very day, 11 June 1981, the Istanbul police, who had been conducting an 
investigation against “homosexual performers”, concluded that “Ersoy rose to fame 
by promoting [his] homosexuality”, and banned her from performing in Istanbul. The 
authorities noted that a decisive factor in this decision was that Ersoy was “seen as 
encouraging young people with homosexual tendencies”.52 When Ersoy retorted that 
she was not a homosexual but a woman, and therefore should be allowed to perform 
on stage, the Governor of Istanbul, Nevzat Ayaz, insisted that she was splitting hairs, 
claiming that Ersoy had been a homosexual before becoming a woman. Following 
Istanbul, the ban was enacted in Ankara, Bursa, Izmir, Kocaeli, and eventually in all 
cities in Turkey, as well as on the national (and at that time the only) radio and 
television broadcasting company, TRT. The legal subterfuge they used for this ban 
                                                
50 The legal ‘logic’ that finds expression here and magically turns liberties into prohibitions in the name 
of raison d’état can be said to underlie Turkey’s 1982 Constitution, the most oppressive in the 
republic’s history and still in operation.   
51 “12 Eylül’ün bilançosu”, NTVMSNBC.com, 12 September 2007, accessed 27 August 2012, 
http://arsiv ntvmsnbc.com/news/419690.asp. 
52 “Bülent Ersoy’un sahneye çıkışı yasaklandı”, Milliyet, 12 June 1981. 
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was based on articles 11 and 12 of the Police Duties and Authorities Act, which used 
to read as follows:  
Article 11. Those who behave in ways that run counter to propriety and 
decency, and speak and sing and play music to such effect, who verbally and 
otherwise harass women and young men, or who incite young persons to any 
and all types of immoral behavior shall be banned by the police. 
Article 12. Girls and women who wish to work in night clubs, bars, music halls 
and other such venues where alcohol is served, or to take up occupation in 
public baths, hammams, and beaches must request official permission from the 
highest local authority in the vicinity.  
 
To summarize, the first of these effectively targeted homosexual and cross dressing 
performers of questionable morals; the second required any female performers who 
wish to work in clubs, bars, music halls, etc., to request official permission from the 
highest local authority. 
 
Ersoy’s lawyers applied to the Council of State, the high court which handles 
administrative rather than legal decisions, claiming that the stage ban was against the 
law and an infringement of Bülent Ersoy’ right to work. They argued that Ersoy had 
been deemed medically a woman (which was indeed the case at the time) and that 
therefore she was no different from other women performers, nor had she behaved 
indecently, or in any way to corrupt public morals. The Council of State appears to 
have agreed with Ersoy’s lawyers that she was indeed a woman, but rather than 
passing judgment on the legality of the ban, the Council evaded its duty and refused 
the application, referring her back to the very authority that had banned her, saying 
that as a woman, she needed to seek the permission of the highest local authority, in 
this case the Governor of Istanbul, if she wanted to perform. So, instead of fulfilling 
the function for which it was created (evaluating administrative decisions, and thus, in 
this case, considering whether the ban was justified and whether the legislation used 
for it was appropriate), and completely ignoring the contradictory claims that were the 
basis of the ban (how could she be both a homosexual man and a woman 
simultaneously?) the high court refused to review Ersoy’s application, effectively 
binding her up in a legal catch-22.  
 
A couple of years later, Ersoy reapplied to the Council of State to lift the ban on her 
public performances. Referring to the recent Supreme Court decision that Ersoy was 
legally a man and not a woman, the Council of State, in contradiction to their prior 
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ruling, this time ruled that Article 12 of the Police Duties and Authorities Act did not 
apply to Ersoy, and that being a man according to law, Ersoy could work in 
nightclubs without permission from the highest local authority. Further, the Council 
of State noted that Article 11 did not apply to Ersoy either, as there was no open case 
concerning immoral behavior by the appellant. The logical conclusion of these 
statements should have been, one expects, that the ban on Ersoy’s public 
performances had to be lifted. However, the Council of State maddeningly concluded 
instead that: “Since the claimant is still a man, there is nothing unlawful in refusing, 
on the basis of Article 12, the claimant’s application to perform as a woman. Thus the 
claimant’s application has been refused.”53 What this mismatched preamble and 
conclusion meant to convey was: although there is no basis for lawfully suspending 
Ersoy’s right to work, it is possible to ban her from publicly “performing” as a 
woman. And what this meant in practice was that Ersoy could perform publicly, but 
only if she wore men’s clothes. In this thoroughly indefensible judgment, the high 
court was saying that legally she was to be considered a man, but if she insisted on 
wearing women’s clothes then she would be treated like a woman. Note the high 
court’s impressive “clothes make the (wo)man” logic here. In other words, this 
decision, no less creative in its narrative coherence and sense of causality than The 
End of Fame, commanded Ersoy to enact a convoluted transvestism, demanding a 
bizarre drag king performance that only certain scenes in the film could match. But 
this time, Ersoy refused the demand in no uncertain terms, holding a press conference 
to announce that she would not publicly perform in Turkey.54  
 
The newspaper archives tell us that this entire process thrust the law into a series of 
farcical inconsistencies. For example, exactly at the time that the district court refused 
her claim to be a woman in the first retrial, Bülent Ersoy was under arrest for battery 
and was being held in the women’s ward. She remained there after the decision for 
another two weeks, that is, until she was released, even though she had been legally 
declared a “man”. Furthermore, in the hearing for battery, she defended herself 
saying: “If I had actually been involved in a fight, at least one of my fingernails would 
have broken. Further, I am a woman! How could I take on this man?” The fingernail 
                                                
53 Danıştay 10. Hukuk Dairesi, 19 January 1983, E: 1982/788, K: 1983/66. 
54 “Bülent Ersoy yurt içinde sahneye çıkmayacağını açıkladı,” Milliyet, 1 June 1983. 
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defense seems to have worked, for it secured her release.55 Then following the 
Council of State ruling allowing her to perform publicly only in men’s clothes, thus 
effectively prolonging her stage and television ban, the film Acı Ekmek (Bitter Bread, 
Yılmaz Duru, 1984) featuring Bülent Ersoy as a woman, a wet-nurse no less, went on 
general release across the country, apparently with no legal impediment or 
controversy, other than newspapers exclaiming bemusedly: “Now she’s 
breastfeeding!”56 
 
The whimsical absurdities encountered throughout Bülent Ersoy’s legal struggle for 
recognition as a woman and the attempt to lift her stage ban are too numerous to 
recount. However, for the subject waiting before the law, its whims can prove 
traumatic, and in any case are not to be underestimated. We must understand the 
devastating effect of Ersoy’s stage ban in terms of how the music industry functioned 
at the time in Turkey. Before the ban, Ersoy’s performances were not limited to a 
handful of tours and concerts per year. When she signed a contract with a club, she 
performed every evening consecutively for an average of forty days, and sometimes 
much longer.57 In the months following her operation, she not only had to endure this 
enormous blow to her career and the Kafkaesque quagmire of gender 
(mis)recognition, but was also bombarded with a series of petty charges (all 
eventually dismissed) such as smuggling foreign currency and forging travel 
documents. This torturous and multifaceted legal assault led the singer to attempt 
suicide in January 1982. In the news piece entitled “Ersoy attempted suicide by 
swallowing a bottle of pills,” we read that she was upset for being called “toplumun 
yüz karası” or “a disgrace to society” –– but literally, “the stain on the face of 
society”.58  
 
                                                
55 “Bülent Ersoy tahliye edildi,” Milliyet, 23 September 1982. 
56 We’d like to thank Veysel Eşsiz for alerting us to this point. 
57 For example, according to the ads we traced on the classified pages of Hürriyet, during the 8 month 
period between January and September 1980, when she was arrested, Bülent Ersoy performed 
consecutively for 46 nights in Ankara, then 72 nights in Büyük Maksim, Istanbul’s foremost night club 
at the time, followed by five straight weeks at another Istanbul club, and two or three weeks at yet a 
third Istanbul venue, and finally on to another 20 days in Izmir before she was arrested on charges of 
insulting a judge. A conservative estimate puts her on stage every night for six and a half months of the 
eight month period. 
58 “Bülent Ersoy bir kutu ilaç içerek intihara kalkıştı,” Milliyet, 31 January 1982. 
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It is entirely unclear here whether life follows or foreshadows art on the matter of yüz 
karası. Yüz karası is not only a phrase commonly used in Turkish to denote disgrace, 
and one frequently applied to Bülent within and outside this film, it is also the 
prescient alternative title to the film, and the title of its hit song.59 Although we have 
not been able to find any contemporary reviews of The End of Fame, the timing of the 
release must be seen as a kind of pre-emptive public relations maneuver to steer the 
public’s sympathy to the star’s side even before the real legal battles begin. In the 
film, Bülent is at times taciturn, volatile, spoiled, disturbed, but in the one almost 
coherent aspect of the film’s narrative, all of the moodiness and misbehavior is 
attributed to one of two things: stardom and the gender crisis at the heart of the 
character. It is even intimated that the gender crisis is in part the result of the extreme 
fame.60 
 
The film posits her fame as a distinct aspect of the problem, the arabesk conventions 
dictating that the heights to which a star climbs be in equal measure to the depths to 
which she will inevitably fall, hence the film’s official title, The End (as in “the 
consequences”) of Fame. As everyone knows, divas misbehave, have tantrums, and 
generally come to no good end, though it may be worth noting here that this is a 
largely feminine teleology, one from which men are usually exempt. The logic of this 
teleology is unquestioned in the film and apparently in need of no explanation. The 
most important function of this equation (fame → crisis → downfall = disgrace) 
emerges in the final scene of the film, when the narrative is able to come to some 
closure by way of substitution: the problematic of fame stands in for the problematic 
of gender with a barely perceptible sleight of hand. When the former is hastily 
resolved, the gender crisis is assumed to have been magically brought to some 
conclusion as well. The question of gender crisis that the final scene attempts to trick 
us out of is in fact the pivotal nexus of the film, never fully replaceable by any other 
category and remaining stubbornly enigmatic throughout. Yet the viewer is left with 
                                                
59 It was not uncommon for an arabesk film to be built around a hit song that frequently bore the 
official (or as in this case, secondary) title of the film, and also the soundtrack released from the film. 
See Stokes, Arabesk Debate, 142. As for the indeterminacy of the double title—this polyonymy is 
shared, ironically, by the other unstable text referenced here, The Madness of the Day, which was 
confusingly published in 1949 originally as either ‘un récit?’, or ‘un récit’, see Derrida 72-73. 
60 We see this implication not only in the title of the film, but also for example in the psychiatrist’s 
response to Bülent in the film: “Mr. (sic) Ersoy, you’re undergoing a psychological crisis. We must 
examine the reasons for this crisis. It could go way back to your childhood or it might have to do with 
your fame.” 
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little choice but to content herself with the conceit that it is indeed the ignominy of 
fame that has brought about this bright star’s downfall; its trappings are, if we are to 
believe the narrative, what bring shame upon her. 
 
According to Martin Stokes, a standard theme for an arabesk film is the irremediable 
fall of the protagonist who has been battered by destiny. Often, the protagonist in 
question is poor, uprooted, alienated in the city as a rural migrant, and cast out by 
society. The basic plot formula that Stokes identifies for arabesk films involves “a 
sequence of progressive dislocation and disintegration, leaving the protagonist in a 
state of wretchedness and loneliness” while the function of the “structural machinery 
of the drama is to provide a series of focuses, each one a stage in the fall of the 
protagonist.”61 These stages are marked by the songs in the films, and the title song is 
usually performed at the apex of the drama when the character’s fall has reached such 
a nadir that the only thing left is his or her honor.62 The End of Fame draws on this 
general formula: the story of Bülent’s fall, as she becomes more capricious and ill-
tempered by the day, eventually abandoned by all her friends and loved ones as her 
scandals reach new crescendos and she drinks herself into oblivion. It is indeed 
possible to measure the stages of the fall by the songs in the film and further, the hit 
song, Yüz Karası, which also provides the theme music to the soundtrack, is indeed 
placed at the dramatic peak of the film. However, even though it hosts the structural 
features of a typical arabesk film, the differences are significant, queering the genre in 
important ways. To begin with, there’s nothing poor about Bülent, she’s got three 
servants, a chauffeur driven Mercedes, and a closetful of expensive furs and jewelry. 
Nor is her character a migrant from the countryside, adrift in big city life. She’s 
wealthy, urbane, spoiled even. Yet she too is a victim of her fate. In her character’s 
own typically overwrought words, she has “reached the height of fame without tasting 
even a drop of happiness.” Though not a migrant, she is nonetheless an outcast – 
banished from her family home, barred from the hegemonic gender order, and without 
hope of finding shelter in the arms of a lover or the bonds of marriage. And when she 
finally hits rock bottom, it would be difficult to say that all that remains is her honor, 
considering that it is precisely her lack of honor, her inability to be brought into line 
that brings disgrace and shame upon her, and leads to her fall.  
                                                






We find the first sign of the question of honor and shame in the film’s poster. In the 
poster’s central frame, Bülent, hair cropped, sits before the law, wearing what is for 
her at the time “male” attire, with two prison bars in front of her and two uniformed 
gendarmes at her back. Below this image is the film’s main title, underneath which 
the alternative title, Yüz Karası (Disgrace) is stamped as if the law’s judgment has 
already been passed. In the background collage of newspaper clippings, which are 
also featured prominently in the film, the headlines shout: “Scandalous” and 
“Shame,” indicating the film’s key concerns. Can it not be said that a film that stamps 
itself “disgraceful,” and announces itself as “scandalous,” in fact embraces or 
appropriates shame for its own purposes? Throughout the film, Bülent is accused of 
behaving scandalously and disgracing herself, as we are taken into her world of pain, 
ridicule, rejection and reprimand, all endured by her with a great deal of distress and 
hand-wringing. As mentioned earlier, Bülent’s dark destiny finds its most touching 
expression in the song Yüz Karası, the lyrics of which translate as follows:63 
                                                
63 We are grateful to Bülent Somay for his generous translation of the lyrics to this song. The Turkish 
lyrics are as follows: Kimimiz köşelerde kimimiz dillerde / Çekeriz biz bu derdi her birimiz bir yerde / 
Sen de feryat ederdin düşsen böyle bir derde / Felek yazarken kaderimi melekler ağlamış göklerde // 
Bendeki bu yara mahşer yarası / Kaderime diyorlar yüz karası / Hangi gönül çeker böyle bir yası / 
Kaderime diyorlar yüz karası // Kim kınarsa beni düşsün bu hallere / Yeter allahım yeter sebep kim 
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Stuck in a corner alone, or the talk of the town 
We suffer here and we suffer there, like a mourning dove 
You would wail too if you were so cast down 
When my destiny was writ, angels wept above 
 
The wound I suffer is a wound of doom 
The fate I suffer, they call it shame 
What heart can endure such desperate gloom 
The fate I suffer, they call it shame 
 
You who condemn me, should suffer the same fate 
Enough, O Lord! Who is to blame for this trouble and woe 
Why so much suffering, Lord, let no one carry such weight 
When my destiny was writ, angels wept above 
 
Notable and rare in the history of Turkish popular culture in that it publicly posits a 
“we” of gender/sexual outcasts, the lyrics to this trans-blues song indicate that the 
character holds on to whatever shred of honor is within her grasp, citing fate rather 
than willful arrogance as the cause of her distress. Destiny wrote her fate, all that is 
left is to endure. As discussed earlier, several of the subsequent legal decisions against 
her claimed the very opposite, designating her gender reassignment surgery as a 
wanton, willful act, the consequences of which she would simply have to endure. The 
lyrics of the song tell a different story, though we will see shortly that in truth she is 
not all that dismayed by this destiny, and indeed takes some pleasure in “enduring” it. 
How can we account for this veritable embrace of shame within a queer modality? 
 
Remember, almost coeval to the rise of queer studies Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick 
recuperated shame as an essential, perhaps indispensible affect in the process of 
identity development and queer differentiation.64 Sedgwick points out that the 
physical affect of shame, what she calls shame’s “proto form” is expressed by the 
                                                                                                                                       
çilemize / Neden verdin bu derdi, verme başka kimseye / Felek yazarken kaderimi melekler ağlamış 
göklerde. 
64 This inspired theoretical intervention was prompted by Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick’s article “Queer 
Performativity: Henry James’s The Art of the Novel” in the very first issue of GLQ: A Journal of 
Lesbian and Gay Studies (1993). An indicative list of this reappropriative move towards shame within 
queer studies would include: David Halperin and Valerie Traub, eds., Gay Shame (Chicago: University 
of Chicago Press, 2009); Sally Munt, Queer Attachments: The Cultural Politics of Shame (Hampshire: 
Ashgate Press, 2008); Elspeth Probyn, Blush (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 2005); Eve 
Kosofsky Sedgwick, Touching Feeling: Affect, Pedagogy, Performativity (Duke University Press, 
2003); Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick and Adam Frank, eds., Shame and Its Sisters: A Silvan Tomkins 
Reader (Durham: Duke University Press, 1995). Sedgwick’s article originally published in GLQ 
reappears in modified form as “Shame, Theatricality, and Queer Performativity: Henry James’s the Art 
of the Novel,” in Touching Feeling: 35-65. 
 27 
pose “eyes down, head averted”, precisely the pose struck by Bülent at the beginning 
of the title song number.  
 
[FIG 11]  
Indeed, in Bülent’s display of shame we see just the kind of identity delineation that 
Sedgwick describes. Having been made to feel the shaming gaze of others, Bülent is 
able to defiantly assert her distinctiveness in the theatrical performance of what 
Sedgwick calls the “transformational shame” of queer performativity, which in turn 
she defines as “a strategy for the production of meaning and being, in relation to the 
affect shame and to the later and related fact of stigma”.65 Shame appears, Sedgwick 
argues, when a connection has been broken in communication, when the desire of one 
is rejected by another. She further asserts that without this moment of rupture, 
differentiation is impossible, and it is precisely that difference that allows for a 
recognition of identity and desire: “in interrupting identification, shame, too, makes 
identity. In fact, shame and identity remain in a very dynamic relation to one another, 
at once deconstitution and foundation, because shame is both peculiarly contagious 
and peculiarly individuating.”66 
 
This very experience of social isolation and its resultant feelings of shame is precisely 
what is being described in this song; the loss of (positive) reaction prompting Bülent’s 
lament. Sedgwick is careful to distance the notion of shame from that of guilt and 
repression, instead thinking it alongside “sociability”, wherein shame functions as an 
                                                
65 Touching Feeling, 61. 
66 ibid, 36.  
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indicator of an interruption of the seamless communication between self and other, a 
point where individuating identity can begin to develop. And indeed it is here, at this 
heightened moment of shame, where we can begin to see Bülent’s trans-character 
finally asserting itself, albeit through –– or perhaps on account of –– the haze of 
shame. When we analyze the lyrics carefully, we see that although she is made to feel 
shame by others, shame is not her own designation of her “suffering”, it is “theirs”: 
“they call it shame.” And though the shame heaped upon her causes deep grief, 
making her plead with her god to stop the pain of it, she never claims to have done 
anything to deserve it, or that she is at fault. She innocently accepts her damnable fate, 
while at the same time embracing it.  
 
The fatalism of these lyrics is typical of arabesk, wherein, “a person is trapped by fate 
just as he or she is trapped by society.”67 There is even a pleasure to be found in this 
pain, as can be seen in the fully embodied affect Bülent evinces in her soulful 
performance. She is taken up with it, transported by it, moved. It is not guilt that 
consumes her but emotion. Beneath her pain lies the steely conviction of the 
immutability of her fate, which no amount of misguided pressure from society can 
change. The fact that she’s singing this arabesk trans-blues in a see-through ruffled 
lace shirt that makes the most of her figure, with the sequined appliqué seeming to 
caress her lovely breasts as she sings, suggests that we are meant to see her transition 
as fait accompli, or better, “fate” accompli. It is a fact, not something to be negotiated 
or regretted, contrary to the Supreme Court’s later insinuations. The flamboyance of 
her costume(s) also points to the possibility that fate and desire are not entirely 
unhitched. From the very start of the film we are treated to a series of outfits that 
flaunt her femininity for all to see. Her fate may have been written to the sound of 
weeping angels, but she is surely going to make the most of it while she can. Here she 
is, caught between fate and desire, somehow making the best of both, despite the 
troubles they may cause. For if this was her fate, she was fated to be fabulous, let 
those who damn her eat their hearts out! 
  
To put this in cultural critic Nurdan Gürbilek’s terms, we may situate this star in an 
interstice between two key moments of arabesk, reflecting a major cultural shift in 
                                                
67 Stokes, “Music, Fate, and State”, 29. 
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Turkey during the 1980s. According to Gürbilek, arabesk’s first incarnation in the 
1970s was one of pure fatalism, wherein the downtrodden simply had to endure their 
plight. She then identifies a perceptible shift, sometime in the middle of the 1980s, 
where that fatalism gives way to an entitled acquisitiveness that refuses to defer its 
dreams and desires indefinitely. In other words, this somewhat fatalistic, yet 
somewhat opportunistic character of Bülent fits right in-between a 1970s arabesk 
modality of self-sacrifice as represented by the more classical and infinitely more 
respectable, “older brother” figure of Orhan Gencebay, and a modality that emerges 
by the mid-1980s of the satisfaction of selfish desire, as incarnated in the “me too” 
attitude embodied by the swaggering, and somewhat unscrupulous upstart, İbrahim 
Tatlıses.68 Gürbilek sees this not as the eventual and inevitable return of repressed 
desire, nor as a transition from an absence of desire to its presence, but instead as a 
process in which the cultural dynamics of desire had shifted. Gencebay’s energy is 
derived from “the fact that he is not given what he wants, and never will be, in this 
world anyway.”69 For him, desire is driven by the absolute unattainability of the thing 
desired, and the absolute honor of the one who desires. However in the cultural 
climate of 1980s Turkey, which finds expression in Tatlıses, the honor that used to 
accompany desire has suddenly become meaningless. So while Gencebay “speaks 
with the gravity of desire impossible to satisfy; he stays on the side of transcendence, 
taking refuge in the dignity of patience. [In Tatlıses] we have the relief of satisfied 
flesh, of appetite relished before all the world, and finally of the admission that 
superficiality is not such a bad thing after all.”70  
 
When understood in this context, we can imagine Bülent Ersoy wedged somewhere 
between the two, yet again, a transitional character. In the film, Bülent complains that 
everything she does is misunderstood and curses her dark destiny, while nonetheless 
declaring to one detractor who is too afraid to go against society’s norms in order to 
be with Bülent, that in the end “one must live for oneself.” The rich but kind-hearted 
Bülent of this film, whose honor is in question, is also a transitional character within 
Ersoy’s own filmography. The Bülent of The End of Fame sits somewhere in the 
middle of the range that goes from the poor but dignified Bülent of the previous films 
                                                
68 Nurdan Gürbilek, The New Cultural Climate in Turkey: Living in a Shop Window, trans. Victoria 
Holbrook (London: Zed Books, 2011), 90-100. 
69 Gürbilek, 99. 
70 ibid. 
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to the flirtatious femme fatale of the later films.71 In The End of Fame what Bülent 
rails against is not only her destiny but also those who try to bring her into line, those 
who would obstruct her attempt to turn her fate into her desire and her desire into her 
fate, until, in the penultimate scene, she appears (perhaps deceptively) to capitulate in 
the face of the law, as it reasserts itself in the figure of the judge. 
 
The tension of the trial scene is quickly dispelled with the announcement to acquit the 
defendant of drunken, disorderly conduct. Following this, the judge, breaking with 
protocol, takes the liberty to address Bülent “not as a judge but as your elder,” and 
begins to dispense his unsolicited advice. He reminds her that she owes her great fame 
and wealth to the people, warning her that she should not become spoiled by their 
applause and disappoint her fans. He says, “the artist is the property of society and is 
accountable to the people.” He counsels her to set a good example for her young fans 
who emulate her, and to be an asset not a detriment to the nation to whom she owes 
everything. Bülent responds with respectful obedience, vowing to follow his advice. 
She is released from prison, picked up and driven away to brighter days by her ever-
forgiving manager Nihat. Aside from Nihat’s unexpected transformation from a 
strictly paternal figure to her knight in shining Mercedes, what remains ambiguous is 
the fate of the gender crisis, brought only to a feigned resolution in her sincere 
submission to the judge’s advice on how to navigate fame. 
 
In contrast with this compassionate, paternal judge imagined by the film, you may 
remember only months before The End of Fame was released, a real-life judge warned 
Ersoy to “get her act together,” in a considerably less charitable tone. In fact, the law 
with which Ersoy found herself face to face in the 1980s was, as we have discussed 
here, highly whimsical, unyielding, and cruel. When one traces her misadventures in 
court through the newspaper archives, it’s difficult not to wonder why she came under 
such a sustained and vicious legal attack. One explanation is that Ersoy simply 
suffered her share of the brutality of the military regime at a time of extreme political 
repression.72 The timing of her eventual victories in her two main legal struggles 
                                                
71 Similarly in terms of her discography, we are beyond “Mahşeri Yaşıyorum” (“Doomsday is Upon 
Me”) but there’s still a long way to “Sefam Olsun” (“The Pleasure is Mine”). 
72 In his meticulously researched article on the recent history of the legal subjection of transgendered 
bodies to surveillance and state intervention in Turkey, Veysel Eşsiz argues that the coup allowed the 
army to impose its moral codes on society without restraint: “Devletin Eli, Beli, Sopası: Anlatılmamış 
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corroborate this argument. Her stage ban was lifted in January 1988. Earlier, in 
September 1987, a general referendum had repealed the ban on many politicians, who 
then participated in the first elections since the coup, in November 1987. Her 
recognition as a woman in March 1988 thanks to an amendment in the civil code was 
also indicative of the relative relaxation of the military’s grip on social life. So we 
could say that just as Ersoy was the tabloid symbol, even if utterly apolitical, of 
victimization by the military regime during its most repressive era, her eventual 
triumph in her legal battles crystallized the relative liberties that came with the return 
to civilian rule.73 
 
Then again, this does not fully explain why such an apolitical figure as Ersoy became 
an almost single-minded target of the authorities. Nor does it take into account a key 
dynamic of the period, identified and elegantly analyzed by Nurdan Gürbilek. 
Gürbilek writes of two conflicting but mutually dependent strategies of power that 
had shaped the political and cultural life of the 1980s. One was the language of the 
Junta, namely, repression, prohibition, and violence; the second “was a more 
comprehensive, more inclusive strategy of power, aiming to encircle by speech rather 
than silence, to transform rather than prohibit, internalize rather than destroy, tame 
rather than suppress.”74 Although it may seem as if one came before the other 
chronologically (the era of repression in the first half of the 1980s, followed by the 
civilian rule’s relative relaxation in the second half of the 1980s) Gürbilek indicates 
that these two strategies in fact always co-existed, “each calling upon the other, 
dependent upon the other for its effectiveness, each owing its legitimacy to the 
other.”75 When thinking about Bülent Ersoy’s legal battles in the 1980s, it is 
important to take this analysis into account. According to Gürbilek’s Foucauldian 
analysis, through a new discourse of “private life”, what had until then been 
considered mahrem (private) was incited to –– and thus encircled by –– speech, as the 
prohibition of any substantial political content in the press required that the media 
                                                                                                                                       
Sürgünden ‘Kabahatlere’ Türkiye’de Trans Bedenin Denetimi”, in Cinsellik Muamması: Türkiye’de 
Queer Kültür ve Muhalefet (Istanbul: Metis, 2012): 185-220.    
73 Bülent Ersoy’s experience is notably not representative of those of other transgendered individuals in 
Turkey during the coup era. A recent oral history project by the İzmir-based LGBT organization Siyah-
Pembe Üçgen relates stories of widespread arbitrary detention, torture, rape by military staff and police 
officers, and forced migration: 80’lerde Lubunya Olmak (İzmir: Siyah Pembe Üçgen, 2012).  
74 New Cultural Climate, 6. 
75 ibid, 7 
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find new areas on which to report.76 This shift in the focus of the media was one of 
the reasons why every move Ersoy made was headline news. For a new press, which 
was insistently and energetically reporting on sexuality for the first time, filling its 
pages with the “confessions” of homosexuals and bisexuals, fallen women and flashy 
men, Ersoy’s gender and sexuality provided endless fodder. Yet what the second form 
of power –– the transformative incitement to speech –– provoked, Gürbilek reminds 
us, in a good cop/bad cop power sharing vice grip, the first form of power repressed. 
Thus as Ersoy was “incited to speech” in the newly emerging gossip magazines, and 
on the front pages of the politically restricted papers, the repressive force of the law 
was simultaneously clamping down on her. It is entirely likely that the very publicity 
Ersoy attracted and even courted made her an irresistible target. So in a sense, there is 
a tragic truth in both the 1981 film’s title The End of Fame, and her suggestion in a 
1984 interview that “All of my troubles have been a result of my fame. This is the 
price I pay for fame”.77 
 
Thus it wasn’t only the newspaper headlines but also the gaze of the law that allowed 
itself to be distracted by Bülent Ersoy’s transition, amidst a suffocating milieu of 
political repression. But what should not get obscured in analyzing this displacement 
from the challenge posed by traditional political opposition and subversion to that 
posed by Bülent Ersoy’s transition is Ersoy’s very desire for the law, her desire to 
obey, to be accepted by and incorporated into the law. Ersoy was not a rebel, she was 
by her own accounts a dutiful if wayward citizen awaiting her legal rights. In fact, the 
problem (and the reason why she continues to prove so difficult to ally with 
progressive political causes) was that she expressed her loyalty to norms, rules, and 
laws at every opportunity. In the attempt to position herself as an exemplary citizen, 
she performed her desire to obey passionately, despite and through her body, gender, 
and sexuality, none of which the law was able to either properly comprehend or 
control. It is our contention that this was the crux of Ersoy’s challenge to the law 
during the coup era: her stubborn insistence before the law, tirelessly waiting at its 
gates to be allowed in, incorporated, as it were, into the body politic. Ersoy unsettled 
                                                
76 In terms of film this proscription of the political had specific implications. As critic Necla Algan is 
quoted as saying, “The political was dangerous and was in jail… Filmmakers were as free as birds to 
do anything they wanted, as long as they stayed away from the political.’” in Women in Turkish 
Cinema: Gender Politics, Cultural  Identity and Representation, Eylem Atakav (NY: Routledge, 2013): 
48. 
77 “Bülent Ersoy’dan kadınca notlar”, Milliyet, 4 August 1984. 
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the law in precisely her failure to secure admission into it. And although she doggedly 
awaited affirmation from the very law that declared “no one can do as they please 
with their body”, she clearly had no intention of compromising on the conditions of 
that affirmation.  
 
This unlikely cocktail of obedience to authority mixed with uncompromising 
determination of will is in fact prophesied in the fictional trial scene of The End of 
Fame. After obediently listening to the judge’s sage advice, Bülent responds with the 
sincerest of promises to remember his words. But she delivers this pledge with an 
utterly submissive yet subtly subversive turn of phrase specially chosen for the 
occasion. She says, if we were to translate literally, “I will wear your advice like an 
earring in my ear.” While she delivers this classical Turkish idiom without even a hint 
of irony, there remains little doubt that the earring in question would have to match 
her necklace and bracelets, accentuating her most glamorously feminine features. 
 
While Ersoy’s desire for the law produces the eminently sympathetic figure of the 
judge in The End of Fame, this desire was clearly unrequited in her real life 
encounters with the law. The only consistency that the law displayed with Ersoy 
before it was the categorical rejection of all her advances. The law erected every  
barrier and in the process produced a plethora of inconsistencies in its refusal to be 
seduced by Ersoy’s constant appeals; in its insistence on rejecting any and all of her 
overtures. In this sense, there is something exquisitely camp about Ersoy’s 
performances before the law, evocative of Sontag’s eloquent definition of camp as the 
success of certain passionate failures.78 The fascinating encounters that Ersoy’s life in 
the coup era hosted between the law of spectacle and the spectacle of law, between 
the aesthetic and the juridical law of gender produced many scenes of madness: 
comedy, farce, tragedy, camp, queer performativity, medico-legal absurdity, 
authoritarian fantasies of citizenship and gender… At times fitting all too well into a 
“genre of its own”, at others undoing itself precisely on the grounds of its gender 
oscillations, perhaps the ultimate coup of The End of Fame is to have trespassed well 
beyond itself.  
                                                
78 “Notes on ‘Camp’”, 291. This piece has been maligned in queer theory for being apolitical, here we 
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